INTRODUCTION
In In re Independent Service Organization Antitrust Litigation 1 ("Xerox"), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Xerox Corporation did not violate the antitrust laws by refusing to sell or license its patented parts, copyrighted m anuals, and patented and copyrighted software to independent service organizations ("ISOs") that repaired its high speed copiers and printers. The court reasoned that "[i]n the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, selling the claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust laws." 2 However, in Image
The article proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the Xerox and Kodak litigation. Section III examines the two cases. Despite nearly identical facts and different outcomes, we find the two decisions can be reconciled once differences in the scope of the refusals to deal addressed by the court are taken into account. Section IV provides a positive theory of efficiency to explain how the divergent analyses used in Kodak and Xerox can serve to minimize the sum of error costs and costs of patent and antitrust litigation. Section V examines exceptions and extensions of the positive theory. Section VI concludes.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Xerox ISO Litigation
Beginning in 1984, the Xerox Corporation established a policy of not selling parts "unique" to some of its copiers to ISOs, unless they were "endusers." 9 The policy included patented and unpatented parts and patented and copyrighted diagnostic software. 10 Xerox tightened enforcement of the policy in 1989 by cutting off the direct purchase of restricted parts some ISOs used to service their clients' copiers.
11 Xerox continued to sell parts directly to end-users of the copiers, including ISOs. Sales to the ISOs were subject to "on-site end-user verification" procedure. 12 Xerox's policy not to sell protected parts directly to targeted ISOs and the on-site end user verification procedure significantly affected these ISOs' ability to adequately service end-users. Although an ISO could still service an end-user's machine, and could install restricted parts ordered by the end- 9 An end-user is defined as "a person who (1) owned the equipment for which the parts were to be purchased; (2) used the equipment solely for internal purposes; and (3) would use the parts solely to maintain the particular equipment." See In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 85 F Supp 2d 1130, 1146 (2000) ("CCS") (internal citations omitted). 10 See CSU LLC v Xerox Corp., On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Brief in Opposition, (No. 00-62) at 5 ("Brief in Opposition"). 11 See CCS at 1146. 12 Id. The on-site verification procedure attempted to ensure that the parts ordered were going to be installed in the end-user's copier. In some cases, a pre-shipment visit by a Xerox representative to was required.
user, the on-site end-user verification procedure prevented ISOs from maintaining a reliable inventory of parts. The lack of parts caused delays in repair when the end user had to order parts, and made service by ISOs, ceteris paribus, inferior to service by Xerox. 13 The ISOs' antitrust lawsuits claimed that Xerox monopolized or attempted to monopolize the sale of service for Xerox copiers in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
14 In 1994, Xerox settled a class action lawsuit in which it agreed to suspend its restrictive parts policy for six and one-half years and to license its diagnostic software for four and one-half years. 15 The class settlement apparently failed to be an effective remedy for the ISOs because it did not prevent Xerox from charging high markups for the parts and high license fees for the software. 16 Many ISOs opted out of the class settlement and pursued individual antitrust claims against Xerox, in some cases based on Xerox's post-settlement pricing behavior. The claims alleged that Xerox violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by refusing to sell parts to ISOs and charging ISOs much more than end-users for patented parts to force ISOs to raise prices and eliminate them as competitors in the relevant service markets for Xerox high-speed printers 13 Id at 1148. 14 15 USC § 2. The relevant part reads: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other persons, to monopolize any part of trade or commerce … [commits a felony]." In order to prevail on a §2 attempt claim, the plaintiff is required to establish: (1) a specific intent to control prices or destroy competition; (2) predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed at accomplishing that purpose; (3) a dangerous probability of achieving 'monopoly power,' and (4) causal antitrust injury. To prevail on a § 2 monopolization claim, the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant (1) possessed monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) willfully acquired or maintained that power. See US v Grinnell Corp., 384 US 563, 570-1 (1966). In the ISO antitrust litigation, a refusal to deal with a competitor without a valid reason constitutes the willful acquisition or maintenance of market power. In addition, courts have required that the plaintiff must establish antitrust injury in § 2 cases in order to prevail. and copiers. These claims were consolidated in the District of Kansas for pretrial purposes under the multidistrict litigation statute.
17
Some ISOs responded to Xerox's r estrictive parts policies by obtaining parts, including patented parts, cannibalized from used Xerox equipment and purchasing restricted parts from gray-market sources. In April 1995, Xerox amended its answer to the antitrust suits and filed counterclaims against some ISOs based on patent infringement for unauthorized uses of patented parts, copyright infringement for unauthorized use of its manuals and diagnostic software, and misappropriation of trade secrets. 18 In March, 1997, the federal district court in Kansas denied Xerox's motion for summary judgment against CSU Holdings, LLC, one of the optout plaintiffs, on the antitrust claims and patent counterclaims, 19 and granted Xerox's motion for summary judgment on the copyright counterclaims, subject to a hearing on defenses. 20 On a motion for reconsideration, the district court granted Xerox's motions for summary judgment on the misuse and antitrust claims, holding that Xerox's refusal to license or sell its patented parts could not constitute unlawful exclusionary conduct under the antitrust laws and that setting "supercompetitive" prices for patented parts did not constitute patent misuse. 21 It did not preclude a finding of antitrust liability against Xerox based on CSU's other allegations of exclusionary conduct, including Xerox's refusal to sell unpatented parts to ISOs and the implementation of burdensome procedures for customers ordering parts. 22 The district court's partial grant of summary judgment on the intellectual property based antitrust claims was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rather than the applicable regional circuit (the 10 th Circuit). Because the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over cases rather than individual claims, it often must review non-patent claims, such as the antitrust and copyright claims in the Xerox litigation. While the regional circuit courts would exercise independent judgment in such cases, and the Federal Circuit is not explicitly prohibited from doing so, the latter has chosen instead to limit the exercise of independent judgment to the resolution of a legal issue that pertains to a matter unique to its exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
23
The Federal Circuit has chosen to follow the law of the applicable regional circuit as to nonpatent issues.
24
The Federal Circuit panel affirmed the judgment of the district court. Applying Federal Circuit law to the question of whether "conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity from the antitrust laws," the court held that Xerox "was under no obligation to sell or license its patented parts and did not violate the antitrust laws by refusing to do so." 25 Applying their interpretation of the law likely to be followed by the 10 th Circuit, the court held that "Xerox's refusal to sell or license its copyrighted works was squarely within the rights granted by Congress to the copyright holder and did not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws." Act, 27 and monopolized or attempted to monopolize the sale of service for Kodak machines in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. After brief discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for Kodak. 28 The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment, 29 and the Supreme Court affirmed. 30 The Court concluded that "[i]n the end, Kodak's arguments may prove to be correct … . But we cannot reach these conclusions as a matter of law on a record this sparse." 31 On remand in the district court, the plaintiffs withdrew their Section 1 tying and conspiracy claims before closing arguments. A jury awarded the ISOs judgment for $71.8 million after trebling on the remaining Section 2 claims. The district court accepted the verdict and required Kodak to sell for ten years all parts for Kodak equipment, all parts described in Kodak's parts lists, all parts of supply items that are field replaceable by Kodak technicians, all service m anuals and price lists, and all tools or devices "essential to servicing Kodak equipment" on "reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and prices."
26
B. The Kodak Litigation
32
Although Kodak copiers contained many patented parts, its diagnostic manuals and software were copyrighted, 33 and ISOs almost certainly had engaged in the unauthorized use of Kodak's patented parts and copyrighted 27 The Ninth Circuit found that the district court's failure to instruct on Kodak's intellectual property rights was abuse of discretion but harmless error. The court agreed that Kodak's decision to protect its intellectual property rights by refusing to license or sell patented parts or copyrighted works was a presumptively valid business justification. However, it held that plaintiff rebutted the presumption by showing that it was a pretext hiding a subjective intent to monopolize based on evidence suggesting that the proffered business justification played no part in Kodak employees' decision to act, and on Kodak's failure to distinguish between parts based upon whether they were protected by intellectual property.
38
III. THE SCOPE OF THE REFUSAL TO DEAL UNDER XEROX AND KODAK
This section analyzes the primary differences between the two circuit courts' approaches to refusals to deal that include patented parts. Despite the Ninth Circuit's warning that the interplay between intellectual property law and antitrust law was a "field of dissonance yet to be harmonized by statute or the Supreme Court," 39 closer analysis of the two cases finds broad agreement on the basic contours of the issues. We argue that many of the 34 perceived inconsistencies between the two decisions result from a failure to recognize the differences in the scope of the refusals to deal.
The Federal and Ninth Circuits agree that "intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws." 40 In Kodak, the Ninth Circuit noted that "two principles have emerged regarding the interplay between these [antitrust and intellectual property] laws: (1) neither patent nor copyright holders are immune from antitrust liability, and (2) patent and copyright holders may refuse to sell or license protected work." 41 The Federal Circuit's decision also recognizes these two general principles.
42
A patent affords no protection against antitrust liability if it was unlawfully acquired through fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office, 43 or if it was enforced through sham litigation. 44 However, neither case involved such allegations.
Both circuit courts would impose antitrust liability in the case of illegal tying. 45 Because Kodak had not yet raised the intellectual property issues at the time of the Supreme Court decision, the Court did not explicitly address the application of the antitrust laws to a refusal to deal involving intellectual property. However, the Court said in a footnote that "power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next." 46 The Federal Circuit said that this statement is uncontroversial in the context of a discussion of the ISOs' Section 1 tying claim, since it "can be interpreted as restating the undisputed premise that the patent holder cannot use his statutory right to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a market beyond the 40 But there was no Section 1 tying claim either in Xerox or in the second Ninth Circuit Kodak case.
The apparent difference between the two circuit court decisions relates to whether lawful refusals to deal patented products can be extended to other markets. The Ninth Circuit, interpreting the footnote in the Supreme Court's decision quoted above, suggests that the Court's statement, although made in the context of a Section 1 tying case, is broad enough to cover a Section 2 leveraging case.
48 Some have interpreted this as implying that there can be antitrust liability for unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent if the refusal affects a service market that is outside the scope of the intellectual property grant. 49 In contrast, under the Federal Circuit's holding in Xerox, the antitrust laws do not "limit the right of the patentee to refuse to sell or license in markets within the scope of the statutory patent grant." 50 The court noted that " competition altogether in more than one antitrust market. 52 Thus, in contrast to Kodak's interpretation of the implied market, under the Federal Circuit's holding in Xerox the service market is within the statutory intellectual property grant to the extent that it is affected by Xerox's refusal to sell patented parts or license copyrighted works.
It is not clear, however, that the circuits differ in this respect. Both circuits explicitly agree that the patent and copyright laws, and not antitrust law, determine the scope of the intellectual property right and that there is "no reported case in which a court has imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent or copyright." 53 Courts have held that a "patent holder who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for m aintaining the monopoly power he lawfully acquired by refusing to license the patent to others." 54 Similarly, courts have found that copyright holders may lawfully choose to refuse to license its copyrighted works, concluding "that Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not entitle a purchaser to buy a product that the seller does not wish to offer for sale," 55 and that "an author's desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers." 56 Thus, the Ninth Circuit might have permitted a refusal to deal limited to parts protected by intellectual property rights as within the scope of the statutory patent grant. 57 Antitrust liability under these facts also would be inconsistent with the economic rationale for the two cases discussed below.
Neither Xerox nor Kodak shielded refusal to deal unpatented parts from antitrust liability. 58 As the Ninth Circuit noted, Kodak can be distinguished from earlier cases involving refusals to license patents because "this case concerns a blanket refusal that included protected and unprotected products."
59
In such cases the court gives the patentee broad protection against antitrust and misuse challenges only when it judges the unpatented part to be a non-staple item -that is, a product without substantial noninfringing uses. 60 Such refusals to deal can survive summary judgment under Kodak and would be subject to a standard Section 2 antitrust or misuse analysis. Indeed, the District Court in Xerox explicitly stated that its decisions regarding the intellectual property refusal to deal did not preclude finding antitrust l iability against Xerox based on CSU's other allegations of exclusionary conduct, including Xerox's refusal to sell unpatented parts to ISOs and implementing burdensome procedures for customers ordering parts. 
(distinguishing
Xerox from Kodak based on the absence of a conspiracy). As discussed in note 47 supra, we do not think that such a distinction is warranted on efficiency grounds. Rather, the analysis in this article is based on differences in the scope of the refusal to deal addressed by the court. In addition, the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Data General for its adoption of a rebuttable presumption that the exercise of a patentee's statutory right to exclude provides a valid business justification for consumer harm seems misplaced. In Data General, the court applied a rebuttable presumption to refusals to license copyrighted works but found that the presumption was not rebutted. See Data General, 36 F3d 1187-88. However, the court noted that the "courts appear to have partly settled an analogous conflict between the patent laws and the antitrust laws, treating the former as creating an implied limited exception to the latter." Id This reconciliation of the cases relates to the Xerox plaintiffs' argument in their Supreme Court petition that the Federal Circuit in effect overrode the Ninth Circuit because the different results rested simply on Kodak's pleading error, which denied it a favorable forum. 62 In contrast to regional circuit courts, which review the decisions of the district courts within their geographic jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals from district courts "based, in whole or part, on [28 U.S.C.] §1338." 63 Thus, the plaintiffs argue that, if the cases involved identical facts, their different outcomes resulted from Kodak's failure to raise "wellpleaded" patent counterclaims, 64 which would have given it a favorable Federal Circuit forum, as distinguished from defenses, which are appealed to the regional circuits. Assuming firms in such cases are unlikely to commit such "oversights" in the future and can file non-sham patent counterclaims, plaintiffs contend that the Federal Circuit overrode the Ninth Circuit.
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This argument is not well-founded. Since the Federal Circuit's holding in Xerox is limited to refusals to deal patented parts and copyrighted works, in order reliably to limit its antitrust liability the manufacturer must withhold only those parts and works that are protected by patents or copyrights.
Furthermore, Federal Circuit jurisdiction over the antitrust defendant depends on the ISO's patent infringement as well as the existence of parts protected by patents. The ISO might be able to avoid Federal Circuit jurisdiction by avoiding infringing the manufacturer's patents. Indeed, in the clear absence of infringement, a manufacturer's attempt to obtain Federal Circuit jurisdiction by filing an infringement counterclaim would be sham litigation that itself may constitute an antitrust violation. 66 Absent sham counterclaims, these cases would go to the regional circuits. 66 If infringement is uncertain, the manufacturer-defendant could bring a non-sham counterclaim that is ultimately unsuccessful. This issue is discussed in more detail in note 87. 
IV. A POSITIVE THEORY OF THE CIRCUITS' ANALYSES
This section provides a positive theory of efficiency to explain the seemingly divergent analyses used in Kodak and Xerox and to harmonize patent, copyright, and antitrust law. This analysis serves to minimize the sum of the costs of type I error (the erroneous application of antitrust liability to a refusal to deal that increases welfare by increasing the incentive for innovation), the costs of type II error (the erroneous allowance of anticompetitive refusals to deal), and the direct costs of enforcing the intellectual property and antitrust laws. Limits on Section 2 monopolization claims a pplied to intellectual property refusals to deal are necessary to reduce the costs of type I error by ensuring that the patent, copyright, and antitrust laws "promote the progress of science and the useful arts." 68 The Ninth Circuit's Kodak decision explicitly recognized this, noting that
[T]he effect of claims based upon unilateral conduct on the value of intellectual property rights is a cause for serious concern. …Without bounds, claims based on unilateral conduct will proliferate. The history of [the Kodak] case demonstrates that such claims rest on highly disputed factual questions regarding market definition. … [S]uch claims will detract from the advantages lawfully granted to the holders of patents and copyrights by subjecting them to the cost and risk of lawsuits based upon the effect, on an arguably separate market, of their refusal to sell or license. … Such an effect on patent and copyright holders is contrary to the fundamental and complementary purposes of both the intellectual property and antitrust laws, which aim to "encourage innovation, industry and competition."
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The following sections examine the effect of the ISOs' and manufacturer's behavior on the jurisdiction of and the likely outcome in the appellate court. If the manufacturer limits the refusal to deal to patented parts and copyrighted programs, the plaintiffs' antitrust claims should be dismissed regardless of the appellate forum.
Further, such a rule is consistent with the goal of efficiently limiting both type I error costs and the direct costs of antitrust litigation.
Note that it is the analytical framework that follows from the ISO's patent infringement, and not the forum in itself, that ultimately determines 68 the outcome. Where the manufacturer's refusal to deal extends to unpatented parts, the outcome can depend upon the different Federal and Ninth Circuit analyses. However, the differences in the circuits' analytical frameworks efficiently reflect substantive differences in the cases selected under the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional rules. The forum, and therefore the analytical framework, depends on the ISOs' decision whether or not to infringe the manufacturer's patents. When ISOs infringe, the manufacturer will have an incentive to bring a patent infringement c ounterclaim that will focus the monopolization inquiry on whether the ISOs can prove "marginal" antitrust harm from the withholding of unpatented parts --that is, harm in addition to that caused by use of legally protected intellectual property.
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Infringement simultaneously determines the analytical framework and the appellate forum.
Where ISOs refrain from infringing, the lack of infringement signals that harm resulting from the withholding of intellectual property alone would have been minimal. The antitrust plaintiff therefore should not have to bear the burden of separating antitrust harm from harm caused by the withholding of intellectual property. If there is evidence of antitrust harm, the inquiry correctly focuses on the existence of a valid business justification for the manufacturer's refusal to deal.
Again, although these cases generally will be appealed to the regional circuits, this analytical framework should be applied regardless of the forum. When the ISOs choose to infringe the patents of the manufacturer, an antitrust lawsuit based on the refusal to deal intellectual property should result in a patent infringement counterclaim and Federal Circuit jurisdiction. When the refusal to deal is limited to patented parts and copyrighted works, the above analysis suggests that subjecting the intellectual property owner to Section 2 monopolization claims would likely increase the cost of type I 70 This incentive is subject to possible further claims by the ISO challenging the validity of the manufacturer's patents. Under defensive non-mutual collateral estoppel, the patentee may be estopped from relitigating an adverse judgment on the validity claim. error. Allowing antitrust scrutiny of the patent holder's statutory right to exclude would increase applications of antitrust law to potentially procompetitive conduct.
Because economists and courts do not fully understand the innovation process, they are unlikely to be able to reliably differentiate between pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of conduct. 72 Thus, there will be a high incidence of type I errors. 73 If the expected cost of type II errors is likely to be s mall when courts give antitrust immunity to a refusal to deal involving only patented parts and copyrighted works, this immunity will reduce total error costs. This analytical framework also would reduce direct costs by resolving such cases at an early stage on summary judgment.
Consistent with this theory, the Federal Circuit's approach would not impose antitrust liability under these circumstances (shown as the upper left hand box in Table 1 ). The Federal Circuit held in Xerox that the patentee's refusal to deal is analogous to its ability to litigate infringement suits. 74 Although the refusal to deal is an ex ante restriction while litigation restricts ex post, both are ways for the patentee to limit use of patented parts. Absent a showing of sham, neither should trigger antitrust liability because of a concern for type I error costs.
The concern for type I error and direct costs is illustrated by the sequential two . 73 The process of enforcing the antitrust laws also may be biased toward committing type I errors. Coase notes that "one important result of [economists' public policy] preoccupation with the monopoly problem is that if an economist finds something -a business practice of one sort or another -that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as we are very ignorant in this field, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly is frequent." Coase, Firm at 67 (cited in note 72 Federal Circuit in Xerox. The issue in Professional Real Estate was whether an unsuccessful attempt to sue for copyright infringement was subject to the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity. 76 In order to prove sham, the Court held that the antitrust plaintiff had to prove that the lawsuit was both "objectively baseless" and subjectively motivated by a desire to impose collateral, anticompetitive injury rather than to obtain justifiable legal remedy. 77 The Court's sequential analysis required a first inquiry into whether the lawsuit was "objectively baseless." If a suit is "not objectively baseless, an antitrust defendant's subjective motivation is immaterial," 78 and there is no antitrust liability. The court reaches the issue of subjective motivation or "intent" if and only if it determines the suit to be objectively baseless. Figure 1 shows the possible outcomes of a sham proceeding under the sequential analysis described above. Assuming that both the objectively baseless and intent inquiries are accurate but costly, this analysis avoids the costs of the intent inquiry under outcomes A and B but commits type II errors under outcome B. Alternatively, consider an analytical framework that always examines both prongs of the sham test to determine intent to commit an antitrust violation. Assuming that the inquiry is accurate, this analysis w ould reduce type II errors under outcome B but would be more costly to administer. This would be more efficient only if the cost of type II errors incurred under the PRE analysis is greater than the costs of additional inquiries into the subjective intent of the intellectual property right holder. The analysis so far assumes accuracy of the intent inquiry. Table 2 compares the PRE analysis with an analysis (FULL) in which courts always undertake both prongs of the test, and when an inquiry into subjective intent is not assumed to be accurate. 79 As Justice Thomas notes in PRE, "despite whatever 'superficial certainty' it might provide, a subjective standard would utterly fail to supply real intelligible guidance." 80 Because both prongs of the test are done under PRE when the lawsuit is found to be objectively baseless, the analyses perform identically in outcomes C and D.
Under outcome B, type II errors are now possible under FULL, but will occur less often than under the PRE analysis. However, under outcome A, the FULL analysis can result in type I errors. The PRE analysis is efficient if the reduction in type I errors under outcome A, plus the cost savings under outcomes A and B, are greater than the increase in type II errors in outcome B. Xerox results in the same type of sequential rule as under PRE. Under Xerox, a finding that the manufacturer limited its refusal to deal to markets within the scope of the patent or copyright is analogous to the finding of probable cause in PRE.
Such a finding is sufficient to grant the manufacturer-defendant's motions for summary judgment on the antitrust claims without an evaluation of the patentee's subjective motivation for refusing to sell or license its patented products. If the refusal extends beyond the patent or copyright, Xerox does not permit summary judgment on claims involving unpatented parts. For these claims, the court will consider antitrust harm and whether the manufacturer had a valid business justification for the refusal to deal.
B. Isos Do Not Infringe Valid Patents and Refusal to Deal Limited to Patent Parts and Patented and Copyrighted Diagnostic Software
If the ISOs refrain from infringing, the case will be appealed to the regional circuit rather than the Federal Circuit. However, there is no clear forum advantage when the refusal to deal is limited to patented parts and copyrighted programs (the lower left hand box of Table 1 ). Consistent with the theory of efficient procedure, the regional circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, have yet to impose antitrust liability in this situation. Thus, defendant should get summary judgment in these circumstances.
As discussed above, Kodak found no reported case of antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license a patented or copyrighted product and distinguished the present case as involving both protected and unprotected products.
Thus, based on regional circuit precedent, the case where the manufacturer limits the refusal to deal to patented parts and copyrighted programs and the ISO refrains from infringement should lead to an outcome in the regional circuits that is consistent with the Federal Circuit's holding in Xerox. A decision to the contrary would be inconsistent with existing precedent and incorrect from the standpoint of the economic analysis presented in this paper.
C. Isos Infringe Valid Patents and Refusal to Deal Not Limited to Patented Parts and Patented and Copyrighted Diagnostic Software
Monopolization claims b ased on refusals to deal unpatented parts in addition to patented parts and copyrighted programs would generally survive summary judgment under Xerox. Refusals to deal unpatented parts would be examined under the standards that have evolved in Section 2 monopolization claims.
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The plaintiff is required to establish antitrust injury, that the defendant had monopoly power in the relevant market, and that the defendant willfully acquired or maintained that power though the refusal to deal. 82 Summary judgment on the monopolization claim based on withholding unpatented parts may still be proper in such a case if the ISOs cannot show marginal antitrust harm from the withholding of the unpatented parts. 83 If the manufacturer can drive the ISOs from the market lawfully by withholding patented parts and copyrighted programs, there is no marginal harm from also withholding non-patented parts. 84 It follows that one indicator of the absence of antitrust injury would be whether the ISOs infringed in attempting to circumvent the manufacturer's refusal to deal patented and unpatented parts. If unrestricted access to a few patented parts were not necessary to the ISO's viability, the ISO should be able to avoid infringement without a significant marginal degradation in the quality of its service. In the rare cases where patented parts are required, the ISO could have the end-user order these parts. On the other hand, if an ISO needs inventory or other reliable access to patented parts is necessary to remain viable, the i nability to provide these parts will result in a significant marginal degradation in the quality of service, and refraining from infringement will not be a viable strategy for the ISO. Thus, 81 See note 14. 82 Id. 83 See CCS, 85 F Supp 2d at 1154. See also Brief in Opposition, cited in note 10, at 5, noting that plaintiff CSU "conceded in the District Court that it could not show any antitrust injury from Xerox's refusal to sell unpatented parts, and that its alleged damages were attributable to Xerox's refusal to sell patented parts, copyrighted manuals, and patented and copyrighted diagnostic software." [emphasis in original]. 84 The district court in the CCS litigation found that even though 99 percent of the parts for three of the model copiers were unpatented, the refusal to deal patented parts was a substantial cause of antitrust injury. In support of this finding, the district court referred a plaintiff's expert witness who testified that Xerox was the sole source for the patented parts and that at least some of those parts were critical to servicing the copiers. Id. infringement is probative evidence whether the manufacturer's refusal to provide ISOs with patented parts and copyrighted diagnostic programs would have been sufficient to prevent the ISOs from being a viable alternative to obtaining service through the manufacturer.
If the manufacturer can inflict all of the harm on t he ISOs through the lawful withholding of intellectual property, the ISOs cannot claim antitrust injury based on the withholding of unpatented parts. In order to survive summary judgment, the antitrust plaintiff that infringed the manufacturer's patents would bear the burden of disaggregating the damages resulting from the lawful withholding of intellectual property from damages resulting from the withholding of unpatented parts.
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In sum, infringement and the resulting patent infringement counterclaim trigger an analysis that focuses the inquiry on proving the existence of marginal antitrust harm. 86 Because harm to the ISO caused by the lawful withholding of patented parts and copyrighted programs is not antitrust harm, the ISO must bear the considerable burden of providing reliable proof of separable antitrust injury resulting from the withholding of unpatented parts, a burden made more difficult by the fact that infringement itself suggests evidence to the contrary. Absent such proof, no inquiry into the intent of the manufacturer is required, and summary judgment for the manufacturer would be efficient. Although the infringement triggers the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit (the upper right hand box of Table 1), the forum does not necessarily determine the outcome. Rather, the existence of an infringement claim simultaneously determines the forum and the analytical framework to be used. as making intellectual property a universal justification for potentially anti-competitive conduct. However, they suggest a rule similar to that adopted by the Federal Circuit and suggested in this paper that would limit the broad intellectual property justification to refusals to deal that are within the scope of the patent. Id at 41-8. 87 Note that Federal Circuit jurisdiction might result when the manufacturer has a non-sham yet ultimately non-viable infringement counterclaim against the ISO. See PRE, 504 US at 63-65 (holding that lack of probable cause, and not ultimate failure of the claim, is standard for sham). Under these circumstances, the court may separate the two issues and litigate the infringement claim before it considers motions with respect to the antitrust claim. See Finally, we consider a refusal to deal that includes both patented and unpatented parts and the ISOs refrain from infringing. 88 This case would be appealed to a regional circuit. Because there is no infringement, the ISO can claim t hat the patented parts were not necessary to its survival. The defendant may argue that, any harm to the ISOs was due to the defendant's refusal to deal patented parts. However, there is no infringement to indicate that the injury was the result of the l awful withholding of patented parts and copyrighted manuals. Thus, in the absence of infringement, the court cannot infer absence of antitrust harm to the ISO part from lawful exercise of intellectual property rights. Unresolved issues regarding the existence of antitrust harm likely will remain, rendering summary judgment improper.
Assuming that the defendant possesses market power 89 and antitrust harm has been shown, the outcome of the Section 2 analysis at this stage Where there is significant doubt as to the existence of infringement by the ISO, litigation of these claims may be necessary before properly inferring non-antitrust harm. This result should apply in both the Federal and regional circuits. 88 This hypothetical does not fit the facts of Kodak. As noted above, the ISOs in Kodak and Xerox engaged in similar conduct regarding the unauthorized use of patented copier parts. Kodak is relevant because Kodak did not raise intellectual property issues until after the case had been appealed to the Ninth Circuit for a second time. In particular, Kodak did not file patent infringement counterclaims, which would have landed them in the Federal Circuit. 89 An issue not addressed here, but important to a Section 2 monopolization inquiry, is whether the manufacturer-defendant has market power in a relevant antitrust market. Indeed, Kodak's litigation strategy, rather than an obvious error in pleading, may have reflected its ex ante confidence that it had no market power because of its small share of the photocopier market. Xerox, with a much higher market share, would have been less confident, ex ante, of such a finding. In any case, the Supreme Court adopted a different view in Kodak, that the relevant market could be limited to the supply of parts and services to those customers who had already purchased a Kodak photocopier and were effectively "locked-in." For discussions of market definition in the Kodak case, see, for example, Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Franchise Cases in the Wake of Kodak: Applying Post-will turn on the existence of a v alid business justification for the blanket refusal to deal "all parts." 90 Defendant should prevail only if it shows a presumptively valid business justification for the refusal to deal "all parts" exists and is not rebutted. Figure 2 illustrates the sequential inquiry described above, which is consistent with the analytical frameworks in Xerox and Kodak and the sequential analysis in PRE. 91 As discussed in subsections A and B, a rule that grants blanket antitrust immunity to refusals to deal restricted to patented parts limits the costs of type I error and direct costs by limiting the subjective inquiry into the intent of the patent holder and requiring the plaintiff to first show the existence of marginal antitrust harm. costs and direct costs. 92 They compare an analysis that requires a showing of antitrust harm before inquiring into business justification with a truncated analysis that does not consider antitrust harm. 93 Because the conduct involved in Section 2 monopolization can often be pro-competitive, requiring the plaintiff to prove antitrust harm in Section 2 monopolization cases reduces the cost of type I error. This requirement also minimizes direct costs by foreclosing inquiry into business justification, and thereby facilitating earlier disposition of cases, where antitrust harm cannot be shown.
V.
A UNIFORM RULE FOR THE SUPREME COURT?
The above sections show how Xerox and Kodak are generally consistent with an overall procedure that minimizes the sum of error costs and direct costs. To the extent that the manufacturer limited the refusal to deal to patented parts and copyrighted programs, the choice of forum is not important, and limiting antitrust suits is consistent with efficiently controlling the costs of type I error. If the refusal to deal was not limited to patented parts and copyrighted programs, both the forum and the analytical framework are sensibly determined by the ISO's decision to infringe the manufacturer's patents. Because infringement suggests that the refusal to deal caused only lawful harm, the antitrust plaintiff should bear the burden of separating this harm from that caused by withholding non-patented parts. The absence of infringement creates an issue of fact and focuses the inquiry on intent or the existence of a valid business justification for the refusal to deal.
While this analysis creates a screening mechanism that is broadly consistent with efficiency, there are obvious exceptions. For example, the mechanism does not work for ISOs that infringe the manufacturer's copyrighted programs but not its patents. That the ISO chooses to infringe copyrights indicates that some of the harm to the ISO results from lawful withholding of copyrighted programs, and therefore that the antitrust plaintiff should have to prove antitrust harm in addition to this. Because this case would lack patent counterclaims, it would be appealed to the regional circuits rather than to the Federal Circuit. If, as in Kodak, the regional circuit's analysis r esults in an inquiry only into the business justification for the refusal to deal and not into the existence of marginal antitrust harm, the screening process would not seem to yield the right analysis. This does not imply reversal of Xerox, but that Xerox be applied in the regional circuits under these circumstances.
In addition, under our framework, the antitrust plaintiff should obtain relief only on the basis of antitrust harm it shows results from the withholding of unpatented parts, while the defendant would retain the right to lawfully withhold its intellectual property. Under these circumstances, suing a manufacturer may provide information regarding whether harm to the ISO is the result of unlawful rather than lawful conduct by the manufacturer. If damages only reflect the inability to obtain unpatented parts, and injunctive relief requires the sale of only such parts, the ISO that requires access to patented parts for its continued survival will have a greater cost of refraining from infringing and a reduced incentive to bring the case.
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This is the correct result, as there is presumably no marginal antitrust harm under these circumstances. The limited remedy therefore can deter suits by these ISOs. By contrast, if the harm to the ISO was caused by the refusal to deal unpatented parts, requiring the sale of patented parts and the licensing of copyrighted materials is not required to restore the ISO as a viable alternative to service through the manufacturer, and would not deter suits by these ISOs. Thus, a limited remedy would lower the proportion of cases where courts erroneously infer marginal antitrust harm to the ISO.
The injunctive relief in Kodak as modified by the Ninth Circuit is largely consistent with this framework As noted above, the district court required Kodak to sell for ten years and on "reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and prices" all parts for Kodak equipment, all parts 94 This assumes that antitrust damages can result from the withholding of patented parts. Damages based on the withholding of unpatented parts may be harder to prove. Since the parts are not protected intellectual property, it is not clear why the ISO could not obtain such parts from sources other than the manufacturer and avoid any injury at all. See CCS, 85 F Supp 2d at 1157, n 14. described in Kodak's parts lists, all parts of supply items that are field replaceable by Kodak t echnicians, all service manuals and price lists, and all tools or devices "essential to servicing Kodak equipment." 95 The Ninth Circuit, recognizing that the "reasonable pricing" requirement "substantially lowers Kodak's incentive to create new products," dropped the reasonableness element from the injunction. 96 Based on the analysis above in this section, the ability to charge high prices for parts and works protected by intellectual property can act as a de facto right to refuse to deal 97 and therefore serves to diminish the error rate of the Kodak analysis.
The Ninth Circuit's holding also noted that the ISO "must segregate damages attributable to lawful competition from damages attributable to Kodak's monopolizing conduct. 98 However, since the ISO did not separate damages in the service market caused by the withholding of patented and unpatented parts, the damages likely overstated the actual antitrust damages. 99 If the improperly awarded damages, trebled, are large enough, they can induce lawsuits that result in type II errors. 1976) ) (noting that high prices are "not appreciably different from a refusal to license upon any terms"). 98 Kodak, 125 F3d at 1224. 99 The service market damage analysis compared affected ISOs with "comparable businesses not affected by the anticompetitive conduct at issue." This "yardstick" methodology" based damages on the difference in the growth rates of Kodak-based and non-Kodak-based ISO revenue. See id at 1221. This does not distinguish damages caused by the withholding of patented and unpatented parts. 100 The district court in the Kodak case awarded damages of 71.8 million dollars after trebling. See id at 1201. One strategy that could potentially induce type II errors would be for an affected ISO to cease operations in response to the manufacturer's refusal to deal patented and unpatented parts. Even if all of the harm suffered were from the inability to obtain patented parts, the existence of infringement would not provide clear evidence that this was the case. The case would be appealed to the regional circuits, where ceasing operations might increase damages based on the "yardstick" methodology used in Kodak. Such type II errors could be avoided by allowing the manufacturer to show that the plaintiff could have obtained unpatented parts from other sources. For example, Ninth Circuit reversed the damage award of a plaintiff that attempted to use such a strategy. Because the plaintiff ASI failed to mitigate damages and "simply stopped trying to obtain parts and let his contracts expire after Kodak instituted its parts policy," and because its contracts were subsequently picked up by other ISOs, the Court reversed the damage award to ASI. See id at 1222-23.
Finally, Kodak and Xerox may have had a valid business justification for the refusal to deal that included both patented and unpatented parts. 101 As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit held that Kodak's presumptively valid business justification was rebutted by a showing that the refusal to deal patented parts was part of a plan to monopolize. While the court purportedly based its analysis on "actual market realities" rather than "formalistic distinctions," it inquired into the manufacturer's subjective motivation, including the "state of mind of Kodak employees," rather than potential economic justifications for the business practice. 102 But Kodak's refusal to deal with ISOs may have been part of a strategy to price discriminate a mong different classes of customers based on the different values they placed on Kodak equipment. 103 Such attempts at price discrimination are neither generally inefficient nor generally condemned by the antitrust laws. 104 If the equipment's value to customers correlates with customers' demands for service, the manufacturer could collect fees based on the amount and type of service the customers demand. ISOs would have defeated such a policy by targeting with lower service prices those customers with the highest service demands.
Manufacturers could not efficiently separate customers simply by raising the parts prices. Customers who demand relatively quick service do not necessarily place a higher value on the Kodak equipment. Raising part prices may reduce demand for the Kodak equipment by customers who do their own service. Raising the price only of patented parts a fortiori would suffer from the same problems. Substituting non-patented parts and service for patented parts would further distort demand and reduce the manufacture's profits. Thus, the conduct at the center of the ISO cases, the refusal to deal unpatented parts in addition to parts and works covered by intellectual property, can be welfare increasing. More generally, price discrimination by intellectual property owners may lead to increased social welfare. If patent owners' ability to price discriminate allows them to serve markets they would not be able to serve with uniform pricing, this can increase both output and welfare. 105 These effects are more likely to occur to the extent there are scale or learning economies associated with the use of the intellectual property, and are often dependent upon use of non-patented parts.
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The ability to charge different users different prices also is consistent with the efficient pricing of public goods such as patentable ideas, and may serve to increase dynamic welfare. Ayres & Klemperer argue that probabilistic encouragement of type I errors (a finding of no infringement when a valid patent was actually infringed) and not allowing injunctive relief will encourage competition and lower static welfare losses. Ex ante incentives can be maintained by increasing the length of the patent. The authors note that price discrimination as a viable substitute weakens the case for their mechanism, which will increase litigation costs. More importantly, the Ayres & Klemperer mechanism can interfere with the internalizing functions that well-defined property rights achieve. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347 (1967). This would result in higher contracting costs for licensing and transfer of the innovation, and suppress follow-on innovation.
extended beyond the manufacturers intellectual property to unpatented parts, both Xerox and Kodak could still be found to have violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. But this does not imply that refusals to deal involving both patented and unpatented parts should be condemned. Our analysis suggests that plaintiff should be required to show that the refusal to deal unpatented parts resulted in antitrust harm separate from the harm caused by the refusal to deal its intellectual property. It is far from clear that the plaintiffs in Xerox or Kodak met this burden.
